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A Different View of the Law: Habeas Corpus
During the Lincoln and Bush Presidencies
Jonathan Hafetz*
Historical comparisons between presidents are notoriously
difficult. They involve assessing choices made at different times,
under different circumstances, and, often, in the face of varying
norms, values, and public expectations. The subject of this
symposium is no exception. Comparing President George W.
Bush’s approach to habeas corpus with President Abraham
Lincoln’s is no easy task, and certainly not one that can be
accomplished with sufficient depth in the brief time we have here
today. But even a brief comparison is useful, for it helps
illuminate the choices made by each president. And important
distinctions can be drawn—distinctions that shed light on our
continuing evaluation of the Bush administration’s approach to
national security issues and that provide another perspective on
Lincoln’s wartime policies.
In essence, while Lincoln’s
suspension of habeas corpus has rightly been criticized for
unnecessarily infringing civil liberties, it differs in quality and in
kind from the Bush administration’s approach to habeas corpus,
which was part of a deliberate assault on the Constitution itself.
I will begin with some brief background on habeas corpus. I
will then address the Bush administration’s approach to habeas
corpus and how it fits into the administration’s detention policy
in the “war on terror” more generally. I will conclude with a
discussion of Lincoln’s Civil War suspension of habeas corpus,
and how it offers a valuable window into actions taken during the
past eight years.
*
*
*
Derived from the Latin meaning “you have the body,” habeas
corpus was the most important and celebrated of the English
writs to become part of America’s legal system.1 For centuries,
the writ of habeas corpus has safeguarded individual liberty by
* The author is an attorney in the National Security Project of the American Civil
Liberties Union. This article is an edited version of his remarks at the Symposium. The
views expressed here are his own.
1 CARY FEDERMAN, THE BODY AND THE STATE: HABEAS CORPUS AND AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 1 (2006).
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affording people seized by the government the right to question
the grounds for their detention before a judge.2
William
Blackstone described habeas corpus as a “bulwark of our
liberties.”3 Alexander Hamilton deemed the writ the most
important protection against arbitrary state power.4
This
country’s Founders enshrined the protections of habeas corpus in
the Constitution, which provides that the writ shall not be
suspended “unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.”5 This provision—known as the
Suspension Clause—has been called “[t]he most important
human right in the Constitution.”6 It ensures access to the
courts for those imprisoned by the government, and makes
possible “the full realization” of other constitutional guarantees.7
Habeas corpus, however, does more than protect the freedom
of the individual from unlawful physical restraint. It also serves
an important structural function in our constitutional system.
By preventing the arbitrary exercise of detention power, it helps
ensure checks and balances among the branches of government
and adherence to the rule of law.8
The suspension of habeas corpus, on the other hand, has
always been understood as an exceptional power.9 It is a power
that may be exercised, if at all, only in a true exigency and only
then as a temporary measure until courts can again perform
their required function of examining the basis for a prisoner’s
detention and dispensing justice.
Over time, habeas corpus has been most commonly employed
as a post-conviction remedy—a mechanism for those imprisoned
under the judgment of a state or federal court to seek review of
their conviction based on constitutional error.10 However, it is
important to remember that habeas corpus historically provided
a check against unlawful executive detention, a remedy for those
detained without charge, without trial, and without judicial
process.11

Id.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 133 (2002).
THE FEDERALIST 84, (A. Hamilton), at 511 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32
B. U. L. REV. 143, 143 (1952).
7 David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59 (2006).
8 WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 145 (1980).
9 Id. at 141.
10 Id. at 155–56.
11 Immigr. and Naturalization Services v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); Note,
Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L, REV. 1038, 1238 (1970).
2
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The Bush administration’s detention of prisoners at
Guantánamo and elsewhere implicated the core function of
habeas, for it consisted of an effort to deprive prisoners of all
meaningful review of their executive confinement. Further, this
confinement was potentially permanent, lasting for the duration
of a “war on terror” without any clear end. Centuries ago, the
King of England might lock a prisoner in the Tower of London to
avoid habeas corpus. After September 11, the President of the
United States brought them to Guantánamo.
*
*
*
After September 11, the Bush administration had to decide
where to bring prisoners captured by U.S. forces and how it
would treat them. Some of the prisoners had been captured in
Afghanistan following the U.S.-led invasion of that country;
others, however, had been seized at various places across the
globe, from Bosnia to the Gambia.12
Guantánamo was not chosen by accident.
The Bush
administration deliberately brought hundreds of prisoners to the
U.S. naval base there because it was located in territory that was
controlled entirely by the United States but was not formally
part of the United States.13 As a previously secret Justice
Department legal opinion makes clear, the Bush administration
believed that this absence of formal sovereignty over
Guantánamo meant that habeas corpus would not extend to the
territory, therefore avoiding judicial review of the detention and
treatment of the prisoners there.14 At the same time, the Bush
administration made a series of determinations that the
prisoners at Guantánamo, as well as others held as “enemy
combatants,” in the global “war on terror,” were not entitled to
any protections under U.S. or international law, including under
the Geneva Conventions.15 In short, Guantánamo was designed
as a legal black hole.

Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2241 (2008).
HOWARD BALL, BUSH, THE DETAINEES, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE BATTLE OVER
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE WAR ON TERROR 97 (2007).
14 Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo to William J. Haynes II
(Dec. 28, 2001), Re: Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba, in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 29–37 (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel eds., Cambridge University Press 2005).
15 Memorandum from President George W. Bush to The Vice President, The
Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, The Attorney General, the Chief of Staff to
the President, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Feb. 7, 2002),
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra
note 14, at 134–35.
12
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In seeking to deny Guantánamo detainees’ habeas corpus
rights, the Bush administration relied on formal legal constructs,
not exigency. It argued that because the detainees were foreign
nationals held outside the United States, they were necessarily
outside the reach of the federal habeas corpus statute, the
Suspension Clause, and the Constitution generally. In other
words, the Bush administration did not claim habeas corpus
needed to be suspended to deprive Guantánamo detainees of
habeas review because they had no right to that review in the
first place.16 The Bush administration further maintained that
by designating detainees at Guantánamo as “enemy combatants”
it could hold them indefinitely, potentially for life, without
charge.
The Bush administration also applied the same
argument to the thousands of others being detained by the
United States outside the nation’s borders, including at the
Bagram Theater Internment Facility at Bagram Airfield in
Afghanistan, secret CIA-run prisons (or “black sites”), as well as
two individuals (Jose Padilla and Ali al-Marri) seized and held in
military detention within the United States.17 The result: a
global-wide detention network that sought to place an entire
category of persons permanently beyond the law.
Meanwhile, without court scrutiny, the Bush administration
implemented a system of indefinite detention without charge,
sham military tribunals, and state-sanctioned torture and abuse
authorized at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Further,
under the Bush administration’s view, any action taken by the
executive was legal if done in the name of national security, even
if Congress explicitly prohibited that action. Secrecy pervaded
every aspect of Guantánamo. Indeed, the Bush administration
refused even to disclose the names of the prisoners, many of
whom disappeared for years into U.S. custody in violation of
basic principles of the U.S. Constitution and international law.
The fact that over time Guantánamo would be brought—at least
partially—within a legal framework had nothing to do with the
Bush administration, which resisted affording detainees any
protections and sought to undermine court rulings every step of
the way. Rather, it had to do with the resilience of habeas
corpus, which ultimately led to three landmark Supreme Court
decisions invalidating important components of the Bush
administration’s post-9/11 detention policy.

16 See Jonathan Hafetz, The Guantanamo Effect and Some Troubling Implications
of Limiting Habeas Rights Domestically, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 351, 351 (2007).
17 BALL, supra note 13, at 27–28, 70-71; Hafetz, supra note 16, at 354.
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The first in that trio, Rasul v. Bush, held that Guantánamo
detainees had a right to habeas corpus review under federal
statute.18 The Supreme Court, moreover, rebuked the Bush
administration for departing from the United States’ most
fundamental and deeply held legal principles, noting that
“[e]xecutive imprisonment has been considered oppressive and
lawless” since the Magna Carta.19 The administration, however,
then defied the Supreme Court, trying to block habeas review by
creating military boards—known as Combatant Status Review
Tribunals—that lacked the most basic elements of due process,
denying detainees an opportunity to see and respond to the
evidence against them before a neutral decision maker and
relying on information gained through torture and other
coercion.20 The administration also pushed Congress twice to
amend the federal habeas statute, which had been in place since
the Nation’s founding, to repeal access to habeas corpus for
individuals detained as “enemy combatants.”21
The second decision, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, reaffirmed
detainees’ right to habeas corpus and invalidated the military
commissions established unilaterally by President Bush to try
detainees for war crimes.22
The Court ruled that the
commissions failed to comply with the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and the Geneva Conventions.23 Further, the Court
rejected the notion that any prisoner was outside the law, ruling
that, at a minimum, the baseline protections of Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to all persons in U.S.
custody.24
The third and final decision, Boumediene v. Bush,25 was the
most important and far-reaching. Once again, the Supreme
Court ruled that Guantánamo detainees were entitled to habeas
corpus.26 But this time, the Court made clear that the right to
habeas was grounded in the Constitution’s Suspension Clause,
not merely in federal statute, striking down Congress’s most

18 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (finding a right to habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241).
19 Id. at 474 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
20 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 542 U.S. 507, 509–13.
21 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005)
[hereinafter “DTA”]; Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §948a (2006)) [hereinafter “MCA”].
22 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 558–59 (2006). The Court ruled that the first
court-stripping statute, the DTA, did not apply to pending cases. Id. at 575–76.
23 Id. at 613, 631–32.
24 Id.
25 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
26 Id. at 2234.
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recent court-stripping legislation.27 Even more importantly, the
Court did not limit its ruling to Guantánamo, but instead held
that habeas could potentially reach anywhere the United States
deprived a person of liberty. The political branches, the Court
explained, did not have the power to “switch the Constitution on
or off at will” merely by altering the place of detention.28
Treating detention as a shell game, where a prisoner’s location
could be shifted to evade habeas review, the Court explained,
would make the scope of the Suspension Clause “subject to
manipulation by those [Executive branch officials] whose power
it is designed to restrain.”29 The Court thus dealt a powerful
blow not only to Guantánamo but also to the broader concept of a
lawless enclave on which Guantánamo and other post-9/11
detention sites were based.
Supporters of the Bush administration have invoked Lincoln
as a historical precedent. Lincoln, they argue, suspended habeas
corpus in the exercise of his commander-in-chief power to defend
the nation in a time of crisis. Bush merely followed his example
by making necessary abridgments of civil liberties in wartime,
one of which was to limit access to the federal courts by those
detained for security purposes.
Before comparing the two presidents, let us review briefly
the actions taken to suspend habeas corpus during Lincoln’s
administration. Following the firing of the first shots on Fort
Sumter by the Confederacy in April 1861, President Lincoln took
a number of steps to protect the Union, including calling for the
blockage of Southern ports and for the states to supply 75,000
new militia members.30 Lincoln also authorized army generals to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus where necessary “for the
public safety,” initially along the military line between
Philadelphia and Washington (following rioting in Maryland) and
later to other places, as far north as Maine.31 At the time,
Lincoln confronted the real prospect that Washington, D.C.,
might be taken by Confederate forces.32
Congress was not in session when Lincoln suspended habeas
corpus.33 When Congress met several months later in a special
session (convened by Lincoln), Lincoln defended his suspension of

Id. at 2243.
Id. at 2259.
Id
See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the
Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 997 (2008).
31 Id. at 998.
32 See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 16–17 (2003).
33 Id. at 158–59.
27
28
29
30

Do Not Delete

2009]

10/12/2009 5:57 PM

A Different View of the Law

445

the writ in a July 4 message to legislators.34 He famously asked
Congress, “[A]re all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the
government itself to go to pieces lest that one be violated?”35 In
effect, Lincoln asserted that in a time of emergency, a president
needed the ability to take action to preserve the republic and its
constitutional fabric, even if that meant suspending a right as
fundamental as habeas corpus.36
Although Congress quickly ratified a number of Lincoln’s
emergency measures, it did not act on his suspension of habeas
corpus for almost two years. Then, in March 1863, Congress
enacted the Habeas Corpus Act, which authorized the President
to suspend habeas corpus in any case within the United States
where the public safety might require it.37 The act, however, also
limited the length of time individuals other than prisoners of war
could be held without criminal charge.38
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War
led to abuses and deprivations of basic freedoms that, in many
instances, could not be justified on grounds of necessity. In
addition, many individuals were charged and tried before
military commissions, rather than civilian courts, even though
some of those military proceedings took place in areas where the
civilian courts were open and functioning—a practice the
Supreme Court eventually struck down as unconstitutional.39
Some of Lincoln’s actions also raised significant separation of
powers concerns. Perhaps most notably, Lincoln allowed his
officers to ignore judicial orders granting habeas relief to
prisoners, including one from Roger Taney, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a circuit judge in Ex parte Merryman.40
Yet, Lincoln’s approach to habeas corpus differed from
Bush’s in important ways—ways that illuminate some of the
most deeply problematic aspects of the Bush administration’s
“war on terror.” Lincoln acted out of a genuine sense of exigency,
initially suspending habeas corpus when the nation’s capital was
under siege and, indeed, the nation’s survival itself hung in the
balance. Admittedly, the suspension power was later exercised
more broadly, and extended to areas not under any direct threat.
But it was also intended to be temporary, as suspension of
Id.
Abraham Lincoln, Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), 7 COMP. MESSAGES &
PAPERS PRES. 3226 (James D. Richardson ed., 1917).
36 FARBER, supra note 32, at 159.
37 Act of Mar. 3, 1863, § 1, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755.
38 Id. §§ 2–3.
39 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
40 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. 1861) (No. 9,487).
34
35
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ordinary judicial process for a limited period of time when
observance of that process was not believed possible or feasible.
Lincoln’s suspension also reflected a more limited vision of
executive power. Lincoln initially suspended habeas corpus
when Congress was not in session—and hence when legislative
approval was not an option.
To be sure, the suspension
continued without congressional imprimatur until March 1863,
and led to the imprisonment of more than thirteen thousand
individuals in military jails without charges or trial, including
newspaper editors considered sympathetic to the Confederate
cause.41 But Lincoln did seek to promptly justify his actions
before Congress and, more importantly, never asserted the power
to act against the specific instruction of Congress even as he
maintained presidential authority to suspend the writ in a time
of emergency.42
President Bush, by contrast, did not seek temporary limits
on habeas corpus, but sought to deny access to the writ to an
entire category of people in a conflict he himself insisted was of
potentially limitless duration and scope and would last at least
several generations. The Bush administration also explicitly
discriminated based on alienage, as part of an effort to create a
permanent second-class justice system for foreign nationals
detained under the elastic and malleable label of “enemy
combatant”—an effort that later gained congressional sanction
through court-stripping legislation.43
The purpose underlying the actions of these two presidents
differed in another important respect. At bottom, Lincoln’s
suspension rested on the notion that in a time of crisis and public
danger, habeas corpus might have to be sacrificed temporarily to
preserve the public safety and the larger framework of
government—a situation expressly contemplated by the
Suspension Clause and consistent with the writ’s history.44
President Bush too sought to defend the nation, albeit from a
different threat than that which confronted Lincoln—the threat
posed by al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations rather than
an internal armed rebellion. But, as time has made clear, the
Bush administration’s efforts to eliminate habeas corpus had
little, if anything, to do with security, and everything to do with
covering up embarrassment, if not illegality.

41 Steven R. Shapiro, The Role of the Courts in the War against Terrorism: A
Preliminary Assessment, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 103, 104 (2005).
42 FARBER, supra note 32, at 158–59.
43 MCA, supra note 21; DTA, supra note 21.
44 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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The Bush administration’s detention policies were driven by
an effort to shield dubious and in some instances patently
unlawful practices from public and judicial scrutiny.
The
administration continued to oppose habeas corpus for detainees
at Guantánamo (and elsewhere) in order to evade review of its
underlying effort to deny those detainees basic protections under
the Constitution and international law, including the Geneva
Conventions, to which every prior administration had adhered.
Those protections included the right to due process, the right to a
fair trial, and the right to be free from torture and other abuse.45
The Bush administration also opposed habeas corpus because it
feared that, in many cases, meaningful review would cause its
assertion that the detainees were dangerous terrorists (or “the
worst of the worst”) to crumble and thereby expose the
underlying falsehood on which Guantánamo rested. And, finally,
it opposed habeas corpus because it feared that courts would
impose checks on its quest for unprecedented and untrammeled
executive authority—a power grab encapsulated by David
Addington’s statement that “We’re going to push and push and
push until some larger force makes us stop.”46
Lincoln, by contrast, acknowledged that a president’s war
powers were constrained by the laws of war and, moreover,
sought to codify the laws and usages of war in military
regulations so that Union forces could better understand and
follow them—an effort that resulted in the “Lieber Code,” a
foundation for the development of the modern law of war.47
Lincoln also did not assert the authority as commander-in-chief
to override or ignore acts of Congress, as Bush did on numerous
important issues, including by claiming the power to disregard
the long-established and categorical prohibition against torture.48
Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, in short, did not reflect an
effort to expand executive power in a way that was designed to
avoid legal constraints and permanently insulate that power
from judicial review and accountability.
This is not to deny that there were violations of the laws of
war or abuses of individual liberties during Lincoln’s presidency.
45 1 FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949 26, 35–36
(William S. Hein & Co., 2004).
46 See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 126 (2007).
47 See FRANCIS LIEBER, THE LIEBER CODE OF 1863: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD 31 (1863) (General Order
No. 100); Barron & Lederman, supra note 30, at 994–95; see also Grant R. Doty, The
United States and the Development of the Laws of Land Warfare, 156 MIL. L. REV. 224,
230–32 (1998) (describing influence of the Lieber Code).
48 See generally FARBER, supra note 48.
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Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, moreover, raised
significant constitutional concerns, including over the president’s
emergency power to suspend the writ, for how long, and under
what circumstances.49
But the history surrounding the
suspension of habeas corpus during Lincoln’s presidency may be
understood as a product of the unfortunate, if familiar, tendency
toward over-reaction in a time of war.
President Bush’s actions toward habeas corpus and the
treatment of detainees generally reflect something very different.
While Bush administration officials also invoked national
security, they sought to eliminate habeas corpus to cover-up
illegality, to cloak unlawful detention and mistreatment in
secrecy, and to institutionalize an unprecedented expansion of
executive power. Their various maneuvers through years of
battles over habeas corpus in the courts and in Congress were
taken not to defend the rule of law but to undermine it—in
defiance of the Constitution and of the truth itself.

49 See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field Theory: Martial Law, the Suspension
Power, and the Insurrection Act, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 391, 397–415 (2007) (discussing the
historical and continuing controversy over Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus).

